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Financial reporting and auditing are vital elements for global capital markets. The confidence in the financial
market’s efficiency is bolstered by the trust placed in auditing being able to operate as an external controlling
function, something that has led to the audit profession being perceived as the “guardians of truth in markets”.
However, concerns over the guardians’ trustworthiness are raised on a regular basis every time it emerges, in the
face of serious accounting scandals, that the audit profession has remarkably failed to meet society’s expectation.
On this view, the so-called peer reviews (firm-on-firm reviews) and government inspections are seen as pivotal
instruments for restoring the necessary trust in auditing. In short, peer reviews and government inspections are
modes of external quality control that aim at assessing whether audit firms have developed appropriate quality
control policies and procedures, and whether these are implemented in compliance with professional accounting
and auditing standards.
Over the last decade, the audit profession has been directly responsible for safeguarding audit quality through firm-
on-firm peer reviews. Yet, the pendulum has swung away from self-regulation towards state actors playing a more
active role, a trend that was initiated at the beginning of this century, when the detection of massive accounting
frauds, that were not revealed by the firms’ audit firms, severely put the public’s belief in professional self-regulation
to the test. As a direct consequence, the European Union, starting from 2006, has passed various regulatory
reforms, requiring European Member States to introduce “independent audit oversight systems”, including
inspections for audit firms with public interest clients.
It is often argued that the change from self-regulation to government inspections represents a trade-off of expertise
for independence because government inspectors are perceived as being more independent but lacking sufficient
accounting skills. In my paper, I investigate whether the shift from self-regulation to government regulation can be
supported through research findings. In other words, I have taken the freedom to find fault with the guardians’
guardians by acting as their guardian myself.
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The analysis compares the research findings on the former U.S. self-regulatory peer-review system and the
literature on the current government inspections under the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB),
the latter being the independent regulator in the U.S. (i.e. the U.S. equivalent to the Financial Reporting Council in
the U.K.).
The analysis shows that critics of the professional self-regulatory peer review system are not entirely unfounded as
multiple studies revealed that peer review results were significantly affected by the characteristics of the reviewing
firm. The findings demonstrate that reviewing firms were more likely to issue unfavourable review opinions if they
were a direct competitor of the reviewed audit firm, and that audit firms strategically changed their reviewer after
unfavourable review outcomes. Yet, synthesising the research on the regulatory regimes suggests that both peer
reviews and government inspections improved overall audit quality. However, the analysis indicates that external
users, such as financial investors or audit committees, do not seem to recognise peer review and PCAOB reports as
helpful tool in financial decision-making, which is in line with an identified rather skeptical perception of the audit
profession itself on reviews and inspections.
From my analysis, it emerges that increased regulation (both through peer reviews and inspections) particularly
impacts the segment of small auditors. As a direct consequence of the PCAOB inspections, almost half of the small
audit firms left the audit market in the U.S. Similar effects can be observed in various European countries, thereby
contradicting one of the main objectives of the European regulatory reforms, which was to break up the dominance
of large audit firms over the accounting industry.
Overall, my paper reveals that whether government regulation has decreased the risk of major accounting scandals
is still to be shown. The impact of government inspection on large audit firms, commonly referred to as the “Big 4”, is
not straightforward. This is because of two main reasons.
First, the debates on audit regulation tend to focus on the question of who is controlling the quality, rather than how it
is controlled. As government inspections are not much different than the review procedures, the risk of “creative-
compliance” exists, a term that refers to the practice of complying with rules by box ticking, rather than taking
substantive organisational steps. I therefore argue that both policy makers and researchers have to move beyond
the classical dichotomy of self-regulatory reviews versus government inspections, and to concentrate more on the
potentials of process modifications of external quality controls.
Second, regulatory failure needs to be separated from the organisational failures of regulated parties. In other
words, a late train does not necessarily indicate poor railway regulation. In the end, it is the individual audit firm that
determines audit quality. It is important to assess the intra-organisational learning processes subsequent to an audit
inspection.
In my paper, I identify a gradual improvement in review and inspection results over time. But can we really link these
results to an actual improvement of audit quality? An alternative explanation might be that the inspection philosophy
shifted over time or that audit firms have become better prepared for the inspections by providing more attention to
issues that are common targets for inspection or by “stylising” working papers to appease inspectors. Thus,
although literature suggests that the results for an audit firm improve with the number of reviews and inspections,
the organisational learning process is unknown, and whether and how internal audit procedures are adjusted within
audit firms is still unclear. Thus, we still need to investigate whether and how government inspections processes
change, shape, and eventually improve the audit practices of audit firms, as this still remains unfathomable.
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Notes:
This post is based on the author’ paper From peer review to PCAOB inspections: Regulating for audit quality
in the U.S., Journal of Accounting Literature, June 2016.
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The post gives the views of its authors, not the position of LSE Business Review or the London School of
Economics.
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